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Garfield: The Case for First Amendment Limits on Copyright Law

THE CASE FOR FIRST AMENDMENT LIMITS ON
COPYRIGHT LAW
Alan E. Garfield*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Scholars have felled many trees arguing for First Amendment
limits on copyright rights. Seminal articles by Melville B. Nimmer, Paul
Goldstein, Lionel S. Sobel and Robert C. Denicola first wrestled with
the tension between free speech and copyright in the 1970s. 1 Interest
then waned until the early 1990s when a trickle of new articles quickly

grew into a torrent of scholarship.2
* Professor of Law and 2005-2007 H. Albert Young Fellow in Constitutional Law at
Widener University School of Law. I am grateful to Erin Daly, Stephen Henderson and Laura Ray
for their valuable comments on prior drafts, and to the Young Family for its generous support of my
scholarship.
1. See Robert C. Denicola, Copyright and Free Speech: Constitutional Limitations on the
Protection of Expression, 67 CAL. L. REV. 283 (1979); Paul Goldstein, Copyright and the First
Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 983 (1970); Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the
FirstAmendment Guaranteesof Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180 (1970); Lionel S.
Sobel, Copyright and the First Amendment: A Gathering Storm?, 19 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP.
(ASCAP) 43 (1971).
2. For a sampling of this voluminous literature, see generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE
CULTURE: How BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND
CONTROL CREATIVITY (2004); C. Edwin Baker, Essay, FirstAmendment Limits on Copyright, 55
VAND. L. REV. 891 (2002); Yochai Benkler, Through the Looking Glass: Alice and the
ConstitutionalFoundationsof the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173 (2003); Yochai
Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraintson Enclosureof the Public
Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (1999) [hereinafter Benkler, Free as the Air]; Erwin Chemerinsky,
Balancing Copyright Protections and Freedom of Speech: Why the Copyright Extension Act Is
Unconstitutional, 36 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 83 (2002); Daniel A. Farber, Conflicting Visions and
Contested Baselines: Intellectual Propertyand Free Speech in the "DigitalMillennium ",89 MINN.
L. REV. 1318 (2005); Alan E. Garfield, The First Amendment as a Check on Copyright Rights, 23
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J.
587 (2001); Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech
and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147 (1998); Lawrence Lessig,
Copyright's First Amendment, 48 UCLA L. Rev. 1057 (2001); David McGowan, Why the First
Amendment Cannot Dictate Copyright Policy, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 281 (2004); Thomas B. Nachbar,
Intellectual Propertyand ConstitutionalNorms, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 272 (2004); Neil Weinstock
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Underlying this surge in interest is a sense that the political process
has become heavily slanted in favor of maximizing copyright rights at
the public's expense.3 Recent amendments to the 1976 Copyright Act
have extended copyright duration to almost a century,4 have bolstered
the ability of copyright owners to use encryption technologies to block
access to works (even when the access might be for a fair use), 5 and
have made the civil and criminal penalties for copyright infringement
increasingly more onerous.6 Copyright owners have also begun using

Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2001)
[hereinafter Netanel, Locating Copyright]; Neil Weinstock Netanel, Market Hierarchy and
Copyright in Our System of Free Expression, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1879 (2000); Neil Weinstock
Netanel, Asserting Copyright's Democratic Principles in the Global Arena, 51 VAND. L. REV. 217
(1998); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE LJ. 283
(1996); L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1987); Jed
Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright's Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. 1 (2002);
Rebecca Tushnet, Essay, Copy this Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How
Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535 (2004); William W. Van Alstyne, Reconciling What the First
Amendment Forbids with What the Copyright Clause Permits:A Summary Explanation and Review,
66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 225 (2003); Eugene Volokh, Essay, Freedom of Speech and
Intellectual Property:Some Thoughts After Eldred, 44 Liquormart, and Bartnicki, 40 HOUS. L. REV.
697 (2003); Timothy Wu, Copyright's Communications Policy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 278 (2004);
Alfred C. Yen, Internet Service Provider Liability for Subscriber Copyright Infringement,
Enterprise Liability, and the First Amendment, 88 GEO. L.J. 1833 (2000); Diane Leenheer
Zimmerman, Information as Speech, Information as Goods: Some Thoughts on Marketplaces and
the Bill of Rights, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 665 (1992).
3. Marci A. Hamilton, Copyright DurationExtension and the Dark Heart of Copyright, 14
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 655, 655 (1996) (noting that "[a]gain and again, Congress has been
willingly captured by the publishing and motion picture industries"); Niva Elkin-Korren, What
Contracts Cannot Do: The Limits of Private Ordering in Facilitatinga Creative Commons, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 375 (2005) (stating that the "legislative process is captured by the content
industries"). See generally WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 25 (2004) (stating that the increase in the legal protection of
intellectual property since 1976 may be explained by political forces and ideological currents
"abetted by interest-group pressures that favor originators of intellectual property over copiers");
JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 14 (2001) (noting that "[c]opyright is now seen as a tool for
copyright owners to use to extract all the potential commercial value from works of authorship").
4. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827, 282729 (1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 109, 203, 301-304 (2000)) (adding twenty years to
the duration of existing and new copyrights). The duration of works for hire is now ninety-five years
from the year of first publication or 120 years from the year of creation, whichever expires first. The
duration of other types of works is the author's life plus seventy years, which potentially could be
considerably longer than a century. Id.
5. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860, 2860-72 (1998)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.) (providing protection for technological
protection measures employed by copyright owners).
6. Digital Theft Deterrence and Copyright Damages Improvement Act of 1999, Pub. L. No.
106-160, 113 Stat. 1774, 1774 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2000)) (increasing
maximum statutory damages by fifty percent); No Electronic Theft (NET) Act, Pub. L. No. 105-
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new digital technologies as a self-help means of expanding their rights
7
through both technological protections and electronic contracting.
Scholars hoping to counter this trend have understandably looked to
the First Amendment for help. 8 The appeal of a constitutional check, of
course, is that it allows judges to trump the political process. Using the
power of judicial review, judges can undo the expansion of copyright
rights even if grassroots lobbying could not.
Yet this outpouring of scholarship has been notably unsuccessful in
winning judicial converts. While there have been occasional lower court
decisions which have invoked First Amendment limits on copyright
rights, 9 for the most part, courts have been unreceptive to the idea.' 0
Leading the way has been the Supreme Court, which barely gave lip
service to First Amendment claims in two high profile cases." Even
147, 111 Stat. 2678, 2678-80 (1997) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C. and 18
U.S.C.) (increasing criminal penalties for willful copyright infringement).
7. Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of "Rights
Management", 97 MICH. L. REV. 462, 470 (1998) (stating that "the growing use of 'click- through'
contracts for the online delivery of digital works" and new "'rights management"' technologies
"will allow copyright owners to set unilaterally and enforce automatically the terms and conditions
of access to digital content"); Kathleen K. Olson, Preserving the Copyright Balance: Statutory and
Constitutional Preemption of Contract-Based Claims, II COMM. L. & POL'Y 83, 83 (2006) (stating
that "[s]ome copyright owners in the digital age have turned from copyright to contract law to
protect their intellectual property, employing licensing agreements that override fair use and other
public interest safeguards"); Maureen A. O'Rourke, Copyright Preemption After the ProCD Case:
A Market-Based Approach, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 53, 53 (1997) (noting that "[e]lectronic
information providers ... have continually turned to the private law of contract both to supplement
and modify the public law of copyright").
8. See supra note 2 (listing articles discussing the application of the First Amendment to
Copyright Law).
9. See, e.g., Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1277 (11th Cir. 2001)
(finding a preliminary injunction in a copyright case to be an unlawful prior restraint that was "at
odds with the shared principles of the First Amendment and the copyright law"); see also Mattel,
Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 801 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding parody photographs of
Mattel's Barbie doll to be a fair use and acknowledging that parody is "'a form of social and literary
criticism' that "has 'socially significant value as free speech under the First Amendment,"'
(quoting Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1400 (9th Cir. 1997))).
10. See, e.g., Chicago Bd. of Educ. v. Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624, 631 (7th Cir. 2003)
(rejecting First Amendment argument); Worldwide Church of God v. Phila. Church of God, Inc.,
227 F.3d 1110, 1115 (9th Cir. 2000) (rejecting First Amendment argument); Penguin Books U.S.A.,
Inc. v. New Christian Church of Full Endeavor Ltd., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d 1680, 1696 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(rejecting First Amendment argument); L.A. Times v. Free Republic, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d 1453, 1472
(C.D. Cal. 2000) (rejecting First Amendment argument); Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v. Utah
Lighthouse Ministry, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1295 (C.D. Utah 1999) (rejecting First Amendment
argument). See generally Rubenfeld, supra note 2, at 7 (stating that "[c]opyright proceeds as if
possessed of a magic free speech immunity, with most courts, including the Supreme Court,
explicitly declining to subject copyright to any independent First Amendment review").
11. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003) ("The First Amendment securely protects
the freedom to make-or decline to make-one's own speech; it bears less heavily when speakers
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Paul Goldstein, one of the early advocates of First Amendment limits on
copyright,
has now labeled the debate a "tempest in a very small
12
teapot."

So what's gone wrong? Why have scholars barely been able to
make a dent with the one group that might have translated their ideas
into binding law?
Of course, judicial obliviousness to legal scholarship is hardly
surprising; it is more likely the norm than the exception. Yet scholars
may also have undermined their own cause by exaggerating the threat of
overbearing copyright owners and by casting their arguments
in
13
guidance.
practical
little
with
judges
left
have
that
terms
theoretical
In this short Article, I hope to build upon the foundation laid by
other scholars. My goal is to present as clearly as possible the case for
First Amendment limits on copyright. I will also provide some practical
guidelines for how judges can determine when copyright laws should be
declared unconstitutional.
II.

WHY JUDGES SHOULD IMPOSE FIRST AMENDMENT LIMITS ON

COPYRIGHT RIGHTS
The argument for First Amendment limits on copyright is actually
quite straightforward. The more troublesome issue is discerning what
those limits should be. Still, the enforcement of copyright rights by
private parties is sufficiently different from the paradigmatic First
Amendment violation of government imposed censorship that it is worth
considering why First Amendment limits should apply.

assert the right to make other people's speeches. To the extent such assertions raise First
Amendment concerns, copyright's built-in free speech safeguards are generally adequate to address
them."); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985) (concluding
that, "[i]n view of the First Amendment protections already embodied in the Copyright Act's
distinction between copyrightable expression and uncopyrightable facts and ideas, and the latitude
for scholarship and comment traditionally afforded by fair use, we see no warrant for expanding the
doctrine of fair use to create what amounts to a public figure exception to copyright").
12.

2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 10.3 (1989).

13. Jessica Litman, War and Peace: The 34th Annual Donald C. Brace Lecture, 53 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 1, 3-11 (2006) (talking about the strident positions taken by both sides in
the ongoing "copyright war[s]"); see also Julia D. Mahoney, Book Review, Lawrence Lessig's
Dystopian Vision, 90 VA. L. REV. 2305, 2305 (2004) (reviewing LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE
CULTURE: How BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND

CONTROL CREATIVITY (2004), and concluding that the author's description of a world in which
"innovation and creativity are under ferocious assault from powerful corporate and political
interests" is at odds with the very vibrant and creative world he describes in his own book).
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In this section, I first make the case for imposing First Amendment
limits on copyright rights. I then respond to common arguments for not
doing so.
A.

Why the FirstAmendment Needs to Impose Limits on
Copyright Law

One can appreciate the importance of a First Amendment check on
copyright law by imagining a world without one. If there were no First
Amendment check, nothing would stop Congress from expanding
copyright rights to include rights in facts or ideas. Nothing would bar
Congress from eliminating the fair use defense or the first sale
doctrine.' 4 Nothing would bar Congress from extending copyright
duration to a thousand years. Put simply, Congress could give private
parties property rights that they could use to shut down the free
exchange of ideas and information.
Of course, courts could also use the Constitution's Copyright and
Patent Clause to prevent this abuse.' 5 They could say that Congress can
only protect "Authors" and that no one is the author of facts. They could
say that eliminating fair use will not "promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts," and that a 1,000 year duration is not for "limited
Times." ' 6 The point, however, is that whichever provision judges rely
on, they must use their power of judicial review to place limits on
copyright rights. Copyright cannot just be left to an unregulated political
process that is free from a judicial countermajoritarian check. The issue
is only what the limits of that check should be.
It probably makes sense for courts to use both the Copyright and
Patent Clause and the First Amendment to place limits on copyright law.
If the issue is whether the duration of copyright is constitutional, the
"limited Times" provision in the Copyright Clause is a logical textual
basis for judicial intervention. 17 But if the primary concern is with
copyright's impact on speech, the First Amendment is a better source for
judicial intervention. First Amendment jurisprudence has volumes of

14. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2000) (codifying the first sale doctrine).
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.8 (noting that "Congress shall have Power ...[t]o, promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries").

16. Id.
17. Of course, the Supreme Court has not been receptive to this argument. See Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 209 (2003) (rejecting the argument that the twenty year extension created
by the Sonny Bono Term Extension Act violated the "limited Times" provision in the Copyright and
Patent Clause).
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decisions to guide courts as to when something should be considered an
unlawful abridgement of speech.
The Supreme Court itself has readily acknowledged that the First
Amendment places limits on copyright law. Rather than saying that
copyright law is immune from First Amendment scrutiny, the Court has
merely said that such scrutiny is usually unnecessary because copyright
law already has its own built-in free speech safeguards.1 8 By not
protecting facts and ideas, and by giving breathing room for the fair use
of expression, copyright ordinarily does not trench upon free speech
interests. 19 Yet the Court has also acknowledged that First Amendment
concerns would arise if Congress ever altered these traditional contours
20
of copyright law.
Given these strong arguments for First Amendment checks on
copyright, one might wonder why courts often seem reluctant to impose
them. Following are reasons why courts might choose to withhold First
Amendment limits on copyright, together with explanations as to why
these rationales are flawed.
B. Should Copyright be Immune from FirstAmendment Scrutiny
Because the Constitution Authorizes Congress to
Enact Copyright Laws?
It is true that Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution explicitly
authorizes Congress to enact copyright laws. 21 But there is little reason
to think that laws enacted pursuant to this power are immune from First
Amendment scrutiny. Indeed, courts routinely invalidate federal
legislation for violating constitutional rights even though Congress had
the underlying power to enact the laws. Congress, for example, has the
power under the Commerce Clause to regulate newspapers distributed in

18.

Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221 (stating that to the extent uses of copyrighted expression "raise

First Amendment concerns, copyright's built-in free speech safeguards are generally adequate to
address them").
19. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985) ("In view of
the First Amendment protections already embodied in the Copyright Act's distinction between
copyrightable expression and copyrightable facts and ideas, and the latitude for scholarship and
comment traditionally afforded by fair use, we see no warrant for expanding the doctrine of fair use
to create what amounts to a public figure exception to copyright.").
20. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221 (stating that the D.C. Circuit "spoke too broadly when it declared
copyrights 'categorically immune from challenges under the First Amendment,"' but stating that
"when, as in this case, Congress has not altered the traditional contours of copyright protection,
further First Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary") (emphasis added).
21. U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
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interstate commerce,22 but no one would argue that Congress could use
this power to prohibit the newspapers from criticizing the war in Iraq.23
The fact that the law was within Congress's Commerce power has no
bearing on whether the law violates the First Amendment or any other
constitutional right.
In the same vein, Congress may have the power to enact copyright
laws under the Copyright and Patent Clause but this provides no
immunity for copyright laws if they violate freedom of speech (e.g.,
Congress provides that copyright protects facts and ideas), freedom of
religion (e.g., Congress provides that Episcopalians may not hold
copyrights), or equal protection of the law (e.g., Congress provides that
works created by Hispanic-American authors will have a shorter
duration).2 4
C. Should the Fact that CopyrightRights Are Enforced by Private
PartiesImmunize Them from FirstAmendment Scrutiny?
The First Amendment, like other constitutional rights, is a limit on
government action. So why should the enforcement of copyright rights
by private parties trigger the First Amendment? This issue, which
closely relates to the "state action" question in Constitutional Law, is
trickier than it seems.25
On the one hand, we know from case law that the fact that a private
party is enforcing rights does not immunize the claim from First
Amendment scrutiny. The Supreme Court laid that argument to rest in
New York Times v. Sullivan when it held that the private enforcement of

22. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995) (acknowledging that Congress's
commerce power "includes the power to regulate those activities having a substantial relation to
interstate commerce").
23. Cf Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 877-79 (1997) (without questioning Congress's power
to regulate the Internet under the Commerce Clause, the Supreme Court still found a part of the
Communications Decency Act of 1996 unconstitutional under the First Amendment).
24. See, e.g., Rubenfeld, supra note 2, at 13 ("Against a claim that a federal statute violates
the Bill of Rights, it is never an answer that the statute falls within the terms of an Article I
power."); Netanel, Locating Copyright, supra note 2, at 38 (stating that "[t]he fact that the
Constitution explicitly empowers Congress to enact a copyright statute cannot immunize from First
Amendment scrutiny whatever provisions Congress might now include in such a statute").
25. It seems clear that the enforcement of copyright rights constitutes "state action" and at
least triggers the First Amendment. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,
555-60 (1985) (analyzing the constitutionality of a copyright enforcement action under the First
Amendment). Comparison to "state action" jurisprudence is only helpful because it wrestles with
the question of when constitutional restraints should be imposed on private parties. ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 507 (3d ed. 2006).
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a defamation tort triggers "state action.
The Court has subsequently
recognized that the private enforcement of a wide variety of tort and
property claims triggers First Amendment scrutiny.2 7
On the other hand, it is equally true that some private actions
affecting speech do not implicate the First Amendment. When a mall
owner uses trespass law to evict protesters because he disapproves of
their speech, the First Amendment is not implicated.28 Similarly, the
private enforcement of a contractual promise to suppress speech will
usually be given little or no scrutiny.2 9
The question, then, is whether private enforcement of copyright
rights is more like the enforcement of defamation and privacy torts or
the enforcement of trespass and contract rights? This question is
particularly troublesome when one recognizes that copyright owners
sometimes use contractual provisions to achieve the same type of
protection they receive from copyright law.3 ° If the impact on speech
interests from these two actions is the same, is there any reason courts
should treat them differently under the First Amendment?
A variety of arguments could be made as to whether courts should
impose First Amendment limits on the private enforcement of copyright
rights, but ultimately these arguments all point in the same direction:
that such limits are appropriate.

26.
27.

New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 264-65 (1964).
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 517-18 (2001) (damage claim brought by private

parties for broadcast of illegally intercepted cell phone conversation triggered First Amendment
scrutiny); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988) (intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim by private party triggers First Amendment scrutiny); Zacchini v. Scripps-

Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 565-66 (1977) (right of publicity claim by private party triggered
First Amendment scrutiny); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496-97 (1975) (privacy claim
brought by private party triggers First Amendment scrutiny); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387-

88 (1967) (false light privacy claim by private party triggers First Amendment scrutiny).
28.

Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 520-21 (1976) (finding no First Amendment right to

enter a private shopping center for speech purposes).
29. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 670-71 (1991) (finding that the enforcement
of a promissory estoppel claim constitutes "state action" triggering the First Amendment but then
finding no First Amendment violation because the restrictions on speech were "self-imposed"). See
generally Volokh, supra note 2, at 1057 (stating that the "Supreme Court explicitly held in Cohen v.

Cowles Media that contracts not to speak are enforceable with no First Amendment problems"). But
see Alan E. Garfield, Promises of Silence: Contract Law and Freedom of Speech, 83 CORNELL L.

REV. 261, 268-72 (1998) (arguing for First Amendment limits on contractual suppression of
speech).
30. For a discussion as to whether such contracts would be preempted by the Copyright Act,
see infra note 57.
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1.

Copyright Law Requires Judicial Scrutiny Because the
Government Defines the Speech Being Abridged

The primary purpose of First Amendment scrutiny is to ensure that
the government does not act in ways that undermine freedom of speech.
Of course, government abuse is most apparent when the government
3
censors speech because of its message. ' This is the quintessential First
Amendment violation. But the government can also abuse its power

through content-neutral laws that have a severe impact on speech
interests.3 2 One need only imagine a law that forbids anyone from saying
33
anything to recognize the truth of this assertion. The question in both

instances is whether there exists a potential for government abuse.
This focus explains why courts scrutinize defamation and privacy

torts more carefully than contract and trespass laws. In the former
instance, the risk of government abuse is great because the government
defines the speech being punished (whether it be speech injuring a
34
person's reputation or speech disclosing intimate private facts). Courts
need to scrutinize these laws to ensure that the government does not
define the punishable speech in ways that would harm the marketplace

of ideas. By contrast, in the case of contract and trespass laws, the
decision as to which speech to suppress is made by private parties. It is
the landowner who decides which speech warrants a speaker's eviction
or the parties to a contract who decide which speech a party promises to
suppress. 35 Because private parties and not the government decide which
31. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (stating that a "bedrock principle underlying
the First Amendment" is that "the [g]overnment may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply
because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable"); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S.
92, 95 (1972) (stating that "above all else, the First Amendment means that the government has no
power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content").
32. See generally Geoffrey Stone, Content Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 58
(1987) (stating, with regard to content-neutral speech restrictions, that "[tihere is a strong
correlation in practice... between the extent to which a challenged law actually interferes with the
opportunities for free expression and the Court's use of the strict, intermediate and deferential
standards of review," with strict scrutiny being used for regulation with a "severe effect" on
expression).
33. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 313-14 (1984) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (noting that "[t]he consistent imposition of silence upon all may fulfill the dictates of an
even-handed content-neutrality" but it still "offends our 'profound national commitment to the
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open."').
34. See Andrew B. Sims, Foodfor the Lions: Excessive Damagesfor Newsgathering Torts
and the Limitations of CurrentFirstAmendment Doctrines,78 B.U. L. REV. 507, 558 (1998) (noting
how the Supreme Court has distinguished between promises to keep silent, which do not raise
serious First Amendment concerns because the obligations are "self-imposed," and a state privacy
statute protecting the anonymity of rape victims, which does raise First Amendment concerns
because "the state itself defined and imposed liability on the basis of the content of speech").
35. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 670-71 (1991). The Court states:
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speech to suppress, the danger of government abuse is considerably
reduced.36
Copyright law fits comfortably into the first category. As with
defamation and privacy torts, the government defines the speech being
suppressed. Congress may not legislate with regard to the specific
content of any given work (just as legislatures do not specify the precise
defamatory remarks that trigger liability), but it does define what types
of speech constitute copyrightable subject matter and thus become
someone's private property. 37 The danger of government abuse exists
because the government could potentially define copyright so broadly as
to give parties rights in facts or ideas.38
The fact that the abuse of these rights will only occur if private
parties enforce them does not eliminate First Amendment concerns. If it
In [the privacy] cases, the State itself defined the content of publications that would
trigger liability. Here, by contrast, Minnesota law simply requires those making promises
to keep them. The parties themselves, as in this case, determine the scope of their legal
obligations, and any restrictions that may be placed on the publication of truthful
information are self-imposed.
Id. (emphasis added).
36. Volokh makes this point in connection with contractual promises not to talk about
someone:
The great free speech advantage of the contract model is that it does not endorse any
right to "stop people from speaking about me." Rather, it endorses a right to "stop people
from violating their promises to me." One such promise may be a promise not to say
things, and perhaps there may even be special defaults related to such promises or
special remedies for breaches of such promises. But in any event, the government is
simply enforcing obligations that the would-be speaker has himself assumed.
Volokh, supra note 2, at 1061. Compare Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 737-40
(1970) (a law requiring the Post Office to stop delivering offensive mail to a particular individual is
not unconstitutional when the decision to terminate the mail delivery is made by the individual
recipient) with Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 75 (1983) (a government ban on
the mailing of unsolicited contraceptive advertisements is unconstitutional).
37. Courts have similarly recognized that the private enforcement of other types of property
rights in expression also trigger First Amendment scrutiny. See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 565-66 (1977) (acknowledging that the First Amendment could limit
right of publicity rights even though it did not do so on the facts of that case); Mattel, Inc. v.
Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 807 (9th Cir. 2003) (imposing First Amendment
restrictions on trademark rights).
38. The fact that copyright law creates a potential for government abuse because the
government defines the speech being regulated does not mean that copyright law is content-based
regulation of speech. Indeed, although commentators have fought over whether copyright law is
content-based or content-neutral regulation of speech, the better argument is that it is contentneutral regulation. See, e.g., Netanel, Locating Copyright, supra note 2, at 47-48 (acknowledging
the claims of some commentators that copyright law is content-based but arguing that "logical and
doctrinal consistency strongly favors classifying copyright law as content-neutral, not contentbased, regulation"). Nonetheless, as noted above, even content-neutral regulations of speech can
violate the First Amendment. See infra notes 102-11 and accompanying text (discussing how courts
should analyze the constitutionality of copyright laws).
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did, the government could hand out rights to facts and ideas with
immunity and private parties could wreak havoc on the marketplace of
ideas with no judicial monitoring. 39 But this should no more be allowed
than for the government to authorize private parties to bring defamation
actions with no First Amendment restraints.
First Amendment Immunity for Copyright Rights Is Not
Necessary to Protect Individuals' Aut6nomy Rights
One of the primary justifications for the "state action" doctrinethe doctrine that provides that constitutional restraints apply only to
government action and not private action-is that it "preserves a zone of
private autonomy., 40 By saying that the Constitution is not implicated
when private landowners use trespass law to evict persons because of the
color of their skin or their speech, the "state action" doctrine bolsters the
with.4 1
landowners' autonomy to decide whom they want to associate
These private landowners need not guess who's coming to dinner
because the Constitution will not force them to associate with parties
they prefer to exclude.
One could argue that copyright law similarly enhances private
autonomy by allowing copyright owners to decide when their expression
can be used by others. This could be another reason for refusing to
impose First Amendment limits on copyright rights.
There is some jurisprudential support for this proposition. In
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, the Supreme
Court's most thorough exploration of copyright's relationship to
freedom of speech, the Court spoke directly about copyright's role in
2.

39. See, e.g., Rubenfeld, supra note 2, at 29 (stating that "[i]f Congress could act with First
Amendment impunity whenever it turned speech into property, the freedom of speech would turn
out to mean a freedom to speak only at the sufferance of federally designated individuals or
corporations").
40. CHEMERINSKY,supra note 25, at 512.
41. Although the Constitution does not prohibit discrimination by private landowners
(because their actions do not amount to "state action"), the Constitution may still permit the
government to prohibit this discrimination by statute. GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL.,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1588-89 (5th ed. 2005). The government's powerful interest in preventing
discrimination in public accommodations, for instance, can trump a private landowner's autonomy
interest in associating with whom he pleases. At the same time, however, there are instances in
which an individual or group's autonomy interests can prevent the government from forcing them to
associate with others against their will. See, e.g., id. at 1588 (suggesting that without the "state
action" doctrine, "private autonomy would be subject to the same limitations as government
autonomy" so that "[p]rivate homeowners might be precluded from choosing their guests on racial
or political grounds"); see also Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 643-44 (2000) (Boy
Scouts could not be compelled by New Jersey anti-discrimination law to accept a gay scoutmaster
when it would interfere with the group's expressive activities).
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facilitating an individual's right not to speak.42 Freedom of thought and
expression, the Court noted, "'includes both the right to speak freely and
the right to refrain from speaking at all.' ' 43 Copyright law furthers the
latter interest in personal autonomy by allowing copyright owners to
decide when their expression can be used."
While there is undoubtedly some truth to the Court's observation, it
is a gross exaggeration to say that copyright's autonomy-enhancing
quality is present in all copyright enforcement actions. This quality is
most evident when the facts resemble those in the Harper & Row case
itself. In that instance, the copyright infringer peremptorily published the
plaintiffs work in advance of the plaintiffs own publication.45 Thus, the
defendant stole from the plaintiff the right to decide when and how his
words would be communicated to the public.46
But copyright's autonomy-enhancing qualities are less evident in
other contexts. Once a work is published, for instance, the author's
interest in keeping her expression private would seem to disappear
altogether. Of course, it could be argued that an author's autonomy
interest also encompasses the right to decide when others can use her
published expression. In other words, a copyright owner would have a
right to declare: "I don't want so-and-so using my expression."
This autonomy right might make sense in those instances in which
the use of a work implies that the author has consented to the use and
thereby implicitly endorsed it. In those instances, the ability of an author
to stop the use could bolster the author's autonomy right not to be
associated with a particular use or user.4 7 To that extent, copyright rights
could support an autonomy right embedded in the First Amendment's
right not to speak.
But there would necessarily have to be limitations on this principle.
For one, it would be irrelevant in those instances in which it was clear
that the use of a work was not authorized by an author. Works
commenting, criticizing or reporting about an author's work, for

42.

Harper & Row v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 559-60 (1985).

43. Id. at 559; see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003) (stating that the "First
Amendment securely protects the freedom to make-or decline to make-one's own speech").
44. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 560 (stating that "[c]ourts and commentators have recognized
that copyright, and the right of first publication in particular, serve this countervailing First
Amendment value" of protecting a person's right not to speak).

45. Id. at 557.
46. Id. at 564, 567.
47. The Copyright Act, for instance, permits owners of non-dramatic literary works and
musical works to object to what would otherwise be exempt non-profit performances of their work.
17 U.S.C. § 110(4) (2000).
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instance, should not implicate an author's right to disassociate from
another since the public would not perceive the use as implying any
endorsement or association by the author. It would be similar to the
PruneYardShopping Center v. Robins case in which the Supreme Court
said that a mall owner's right not to speak was not infringed by a
California law that compelled him to permit protesters onto his
property. 48 The Court explained that no one would associate the
the mall owner
protesters' speech with that of the mall owner's so that
49
will.
was not being forced to say something against his

Moreover, it is not clear what an autonomous "right not to speak"
means in the context of a property right that an author can freely assign
to others. Is there any autonomy right left once an author has parted with
copyright ownership? Absent contractual restrictions, authors cannot
usually stop a copyright owner from licensing an author's work in ways
of which he would disapprove. 50 And the assignee could hardly claim
any autonomy right in someone else's expression.
Even for unpublished works, there would seem to be instances in
which First Amendment rights should trump an author's autonomy right.
Indeed, as commentators have noted, one person's autonomy right can
often be another's person deprivation of rights.' If I do not want you on
my land because of the color of your skin, then kicking you off furthers
my autonomy interest but violates your right to equal treatment.
Similarly, one person's autonomy right to control the use of his
expression is another person's deprivation of the right to speak, even if
the speech was initially someone else's expression. The balance might
usually tip in favor of an author's right to control his speech, but it can
sometimes tip the other way. For instance, if a candidate for public
office claimed that he never used illegal drugs, but he had written
unpublished letters discussing such use, then a speaker's right to quote
from these letters would undoubtedly outweigh any countervailing right
not to speak. This is similar to the balance struck in the recent Bartnicki
v. Vopper case, in which the court found that any legitimate privacy
interest on the part of the plaintiff was outweighed by the public's right
to access speech on a matter of public concern.

48. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980).
49. Id. at 87 (stating that "[t]he views expressed by members of the public in passing out
pamphlets or seeking signatures for a petition . . . will not likely be identified with those of the

owner").
50.
51.
52.

There are some limited exceptions for works of visual art. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2000).
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 25, at 512.
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 532-35 (2001).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2007

13

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 3 [2007], Art. 8
HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 35:1169

In sum, even if copyright rights might bolster an individual's First
Amendment right not to speak, there are many instances in which this
interest is irrelevant. Certainly, this interest by itself cannot justify
complete immunization of copyright law from First Amendment
scrutiny, particularly in those instances in which there is no credible
autonomy right and there is a strong First Amendment interest on the
part of the person who wants to use the expression.
3.

Even Contract and Trespass Laws Should Not Be Immune
from First Amendment Scrutiny
Thus far, I have argued that copyright laws, like defamation and
privacy laws, pose a risk of government abuse and therefore merit
judicial monitoring even though copyright rights are enforced by private
parties. Likewise, the need to protect an individual's autonomy interests
is less pronounced in the copyright context than in the context of other
laws such as contract or trespass.
While these arguments might explain why courts should monitor
copyright's impact on speech more carefully than the impact of contract
and trespass laws, it should be noted that even these latter laws should
not be absolutely immune from First Amendment scrutiny. The reason is
that both of them, under certain circumstances, could have a severe
negative impact on speech interests.
Trespass laws, for instance, in ordinary circumstances do not pose a
serious threat to free speech interests. As noted above, the danger of
government abuse is not present because it is private parties and not the
government who decide what speech to discriminate against.53 By
immunizing trespass laws from First Amendment scrutiny, courts bolster
the autonomy right of private citizens to choose which speakers to
associate with on their own property. Moreover, the impact on free
speech interests of immunizing trespass actions from judicial scrutiny is
arguably minimal. As long as speakers have access to government
forums for communicating their ideas-classically, the streets,
sidewalks, and parks-the marketplace of ideas will remain healthy
notwithstanding the speech biases of private landowners.
Yet things would not be so tidy if government forums disappeared
or were no longer public gathering places. If that were to occur, then
First Amendment interests would be seriously jeopardized if courts did
not impose First Amendment restraints on private landowners.
Otherwise, citizens would lack access to forums where face-to-face
53.

See supra Part ICI.
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grassroots communications could occur. Powerful arguments could then
be made for expanding the rules regarding public forums to private
like traditional public forums (malls, gated
property that is used
54
communities, etc.).

Contracts suppressing speech can be even more threatening to free
speech interests. This is particularly evident when one considers the
relationship between contract law and copyright law.
Imagine, for instance, a copyright owner of software selling his
software online. Customers who purchase the software must accept an
electronic license agreement that accompanies the software download.
Until a customer clicks "I Accept," the transaction is not completed and
the customer will not gain access to the software.
Not surprisingly, most customers click "I Accept" without ever
reading the license agreement. Nevertheless, some of the many terms
they "accept" are ones that prohibit the software's reproduction or the
creation of derivative works without permission. These restrictions, of
course, are redundant in the sense that they mirror protections that the
copyright owner already has under copyright law.55
Now pretend that the customer starts unlawfully making copies. If
the software owner sues for both copyright infringement and breach of
contract, should only the former action raise First Amendment concerns?
One could certainly argue for that result because only the copyright
claim involves government created rights in speech. By contrast, any
restraint on speech in the contract context occurs solely because the
customer agreed to restrain his or her speech. The specter of government
censorship, in other words, is absent because the speech suppression
occurred only because of the voluntary consent of a private party.
This argument certainly has merit. But it can become remarkably
artificial in a world in which copyrightable works are routinely
distributed with accompanying electronic license agreements.56 The
impact of enforcing these agreements might be as great or greater than

54.

See, e.g., Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 539-40 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting)

("[T]he owner of the modem shopping center complex, by dedicating his property to public use as a
business district, to some extent displaces the 'State' from control of historical First Amendment
forums, and may acquire a virtual monopoly of places suitable for effective communication. The
roadways, parking lots, and walkways of the modem shopping center may be as essential for

effective speech as the streets and sidewalks in the municipal or company-owned town.").
55. Courts are split as to whether such contracts are preempted by the Copyright Act. See,
e.g., Kabehie v. Zoland, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 721, 731-34 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (summarizing the
decisions on both sides of the debate).
56. Julie Cohen has noted that copyright management systems might prevent anyone but a

licensee from accessing a copyrighted work. Cohen, supra note 7, at 487.
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copyright law since the contracts might place limits on the use of a work
that go beyond copyright law (prohibiting fair use, for instance, or the
use of facts or ideas).57 Should the fact that customers have objectively
"assented" to the terms be the deciding factor in whether the First
Amendment applies?
None of this, of course, should detract from the primary observation
that the First Amendment needs to set limits on copyright law. For the
moment, it is enough to recognize that First Amendment interests might
be poorly served if limits are not also placed on contracts , with
copyright-like restraints.
D. Should Copyright Law Be Immune from FirstAmendment Scrutiny
Because It IncorporatesFree Speech Safeguards?
Courts frequently say that there is no need to impose First
Amendment restraints on copyright law because copyright law already
incorporates
speech protections.5 8 Copyright's idea/expression
dichotomy ensures that copyright law does not protect either facts or
57. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1455 (7th Cir. 1996) ("[W]hether a particular
license is generous or restrictive, a simple two-party contract is not 'equivalent to any of the
exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright' and therefore may be enforced."); see also
Olson, supra note 7, at 88 (stating that "the model for online publishing is shifting from a propertybased system of transactions governed by copyright law to a contract-based system of transactions
governed by whatever terms the market will bear, even if such terms do not further the prodissemination values inherent in the Copyright Clause and in copyright law"); Cohen, supra note 7,
at 472-73 (stating that "copyright owners will be able to implement contractual restrictions
prohibiting reuse of the ideas, facts, or functional principles contained in a work"). Of course,
Congress is always free to legislatively restrict the ability of copyright owners to use contracts to
complement or supplement their copyright rights. In the copyright law context, this is most likely to
occur through statutory preemption of state contract claims. Courts have generally found that
contract claims are not preempted by section 301 of the Copyright Act, although some courts find
preemption when the rights protected by a contract are equivalent to copyright rights. See, e.g.,
Kabehie, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 731-34 (summarizing the case law on the preemption of contract
claims); see generally MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 1.0l[B][l][a][i] (2006) (discussing copyright preemption of contract claims).
58. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985) ("In view of
the First Amendment protections already embodied in the Copyright Act's distinction between
copyrightable expression and uncopyrightable facts and ideas, and the latitude for scholarship and
comment traditionally afforded by fair use, we see no warrant for expanding the doctrine of fair use
to create what amounts to a public figure exception to copyright."); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Henson,
182 F.3d 927, 927 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that the defendant's First Amendment "argument fails in
light of [the Supreme Court's decision in] Harper& Row... in which the Court stated that the laws
of the Copyright Act already embrace First Amendment concerns"); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster,
114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 922 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (quoting Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Bus.
Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65, 74 (2d Cir. 1999)) (stating that free speech concerns "are protected by and
coextensive with the fair use doctrine"); L.A. Times v. Free Republic, 54 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1453, 1472
(C.D. Cal. 2000) (stating that free speech concerns "are subsumed within the fair use Analysis").
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ideas but only the expression of ideas. 59 Likewise, the fair use doctrine
allows for the use of expression if there is an overriding public interest
to justify the use (parodies, news reporting, commentary, scholarship).6 °
This is a perfectly legitimate argument. Indeed, courts should not
reach constitutional claims if they can resolve cases through copyright
doctrine alone. Yet it is important to remember that just because
copyright provides some free speech protection does not mean that
copyright is not subject to First Amendment limits. To the contrary, it
merely means that courts can frequently avoid addressing those limits
because they can resolve copyright/free speech conflicts through
copyright law. But if copyright law ever failed to adequately protect
speech interests, courts would have to intervene under the First
Amendment to ensure that freedom of speech was not jeopardized.
In the same vein, the common law of defamation could easily
include all of the safeguards mandated by New York Times v. Sullivan
and its progeny.61 If it did, then courts would rarely need to address First
Amendment issues because the rules regarding actual malice, burdens of
proof, and limits on presumed and punitive damages would be built into
the state tort law. Nevertheless, it is clear that, if a state ever modified its
defamation law so that it varied from First Amendment dictates, courts
would have to intervene to ensure that free speech interests were fully
protected.
The same is true with copyright law. While it is true that the
idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use doctrine are capable of
resolving most conflicts between freedom of speech and copyright
rights, it is equally true that the First Amendment prevents Congress
from altering these doctrines in any way that would unduly interfere
with speech interests.
Even if Congress keeps the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair
use doctrine intact, courts still may interpret these doctrines in ways that

59. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000) (codifying rule that copyright law does not protect ideas).
60. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000) (codifying the fair use doctrine); see also Sega Enters. v.
Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1523 (9th Cir. 1993) ("Public benefit need not be direct or tangible,
but may arise because the challenged use serves a public interest ....
Accolade's identification of
the functional requirements for Genesis compatibility has led to an increase in the number of
independently designed video game programs offered for use with the Genesis console. It is
precisely this growth in creative expression, based on the dissemination of other creative works and
the unprotected ideas contained in those works, that the Copyright Act was intended to promote.")
(citation omitted).
61. The common law of defamation did contain certain defenses that were intended to protect
free speech interests. See generally HARVEY L. ZUCKMAN ET AL., MODERN COMMUNICATIONS LAW
416-17,422-24 (1999) (discussing the common law defenses of truth and fair comment).
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are inadequately sensitive to free speech interests.6 2 In those instances, a
First Amendment corrective would also be in order. Likewise, the very
vagueness of these doctrines can raise First Amendment concerns,
particularly since First Amendment jurisprudence is acutely sensitive to
the chilling effects of vague speech regulations.6 3
III.

WHEN JUDGES SHOULD FIND COPYRIGHT LAW

IN

VIOLATION OF

THE FIRST AMENDMENT
While it may be clear that courts should impose some First
Amendment limits on copyright law, it is far from clear what those
limits should be. Copyright, after all, is in most instances "an engine of
free expression." 64 By giving authors incentives to create works and
publishers incentives to distribute them, copyright furthers free speech
interests. How, then, can courts know when copyright crosses the line
from supporting the First Amendment to opposing it?
Needless to say, there is no bright line for making this distinction.
Ultimately, the answer lies in a careful balancing of interests.
Nevertheless, First Amendment jurisprudence is sufficiently rich that
one can distill fairly clear principles for when a judge should find
copyright law in violation of the First Amendment.
This section will review First Amendment jurisprudence to
extrapolate general principles for when an abridgement of speech should
be found unconstitutional. It will then show how these principles can
guide judges in determining when copyright law unduly impinges on
speech interests.

62. For instance, one strand of scholarship suggests that the fair use privilege should only be
available when the transaction costs of negotiating permission are prohibitive. These transaction
costs, however, are likely to shrink as more and more works are distributed electronically, thus
resulting in a concomitant shrinkage in the range of uses that would be considered fair use. Cohen,
supra note 7, at 471-72.
63. Lawrence Lessig has noted that the "fuzzy lines" of the fair use doctrine combined with
the potentially "extraordinary liability" if a use is not fair means that the value of the doctrine "for
many types of creators is slight." LESSIG, supra note 2, at 99; see generally MARJORIE HEINS &
TRICIA BECKLES, WILL FAIR USE SURVIVE? FREE EXPRESSION 1N THE AGE OF COPYRIGHT

CONTROL 54 (2005) (documenting how confusion about the proper scope of fair use often
suppresses speech).
64. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985).
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ExtrapolatingGeneral Principlesfor What Constitutes an Unlawful
Abridgement of Speech

One can extrapolate from First Amendment jurisprudence two
primary scenarios in which government actions unlawfully abridge
speech. The first occurs when the government's purpose for regulating
speech is illegitimate. The classic example, of course, is when the
government regulates speech because it does not like the message or
because it finds an idea offensive. 65 This type of regulation is at
loggerheads with the First Amendment's core "neutrality principle"that the government should not decide which ideas are worthy of public
discourse-and is almost always found unconstitutional.66
This specter of government censorship is what prompts courts to
strictly scrutinize content-based regulations (because there is always a
danger that government censorship is afoot), and to treat viewpoint
discrimination as virtually per se unconstitutional.6 7 Of course, there are
occasionally situations in which the government is legitimately
regulating speech based on its content (for example, to protect children
or privacy interests). 68 In those instances, judges have no choice but to
wrestle with difficult balancing issues. But, for the most part,
government regulation of content outside of special contexts (e.g.,
education, funding, non-public forums) is largely inappropriate.69
The second scenario occurs when the government's purpose for
regulating speech is legitimate but the regulation's impact on speech
interests is intolerable. A classic example is a content-neutral time, place
and manner law done for a legitimate purpose but with an unacceptable
impact on speech. In Schneider v. New Jersey, for instance, the Supreme
Court found that a law banning leafleting, while enacted for the
65.

Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989).

66. RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 4:8 (2007)
(stating that "[m]odem First Amendment cases establish a per se rule making the punishment of
speech flatly unconstitutional if the penalty is based on the offensiveness or the undesirability of the
viewpoint expressed").
67. Hill v'Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 743 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The vice of contentbased legislation-what renders it deserving of the high standard of strict scrutiny-is not that it is
always used for invidious, thought-control purposes, but that it lends itself to use for those
purposes."); R.A.V.v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395-96 (1992) (finding unconstitutional an
ordinance embodying viewpoint discrimination by the government).
68. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 532-35 (2001) (balancing privacy interests and speech
interests); see also Alan E. Garfield, Protecting Childrenfrom Speech, 57 FLA. L. REV. 565, 566
(2005) (discussing balancing issues that arise with laws designed to protect minors from harmful
speech).
69. See generally SMOLLA, supra note 66, at § 4:4 (discussing how strict scrutiny analysis of
content-based regulations can be lessened "in situations involving certain special settings").
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legitimate purpose of controlling littering, was nevertheless
unconstitutional because it banned a vital method of grassroots
communication.7 °
Intellectual property laws, as well as contract law, typically fall into
this latter category. No one questions that the government has a
legitimate reason for creating and enforcing these laws. Problems arise
only because the laws are occasionally used in ways that have a severe
impact on speech.7 '
In this latter scenario, judges cannot boldly pronounce the laws
unconstitutional as illegitimate. Instead, judges must wade into the
murky waters of balancing the government's legitimate interest in
speech regulation against the impact of the regulation on speech
*72
Empirical data might help elucidate how this balance should
interests.
come out but it is unlikely to be decisive. Ultimately, judges have to
make their best guess as to whether a law's impact on public discourse
can be tolerated.
Judges reviewing the constitutionality of copyright laws and the
private enforcement of copyright rights should keep these two scenarios
in mind. Both scenarios can arise in the copyright context. There are
some instances in which private parties use copyright rights for the
illegitimate purpose of censorship. Courts should readily find such
actions unconstitutional. More commonly, copyright rights are used for
legitimate purposes. In those instances, courts must consider whether the
impact of these rights on speech interests is tolerable. In the garden
variety copyright infringement case, this is usually not a problem. But

70. 308 U.S. 147, 164-65 (1939); see also Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y v. Stratton, 536
U.S. 150, 180 (2002) (invalidating municipal ordinance that required door-to-door solicitors to first
receive a permit from the city); City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 57 (1994) (invalidating ban on
residential signs for aesthetic purposes because it cut off "an usually cheap and convenient form of
communication"); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 145-46 (1943) (while invalidating a
ban on door-to-door solicitations, the Court noted that door-to-door solicitors may be either "a
nuisance or a blind for criminal activities" but that the door-to-door distribution of literature is also
"essential to the poorly financed causes of little people").
71. See Farber, supra note 2, at 1353 (in discussing how courts should analyze copyright laws
under the First Amendment, the author notes that "[p]arsing terms like 'content neutrality' is
unlikely to definitively establish the level of scrutiny" and that "the determining factor is likely to
be the statute's potential impact on speech values").
72. See supra note 70 for cases where, after balancing the interests, the Court found the
government regulations had an intolerable impact on speech. For cases in which the Court upheld
government regulations notwithstanding their impact on speech, see Members of City Council of
L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984) (upholding a ban on the posting of signs on
public property); Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) (upholding Park
Service regulation notwithstanding its incidental impact on demonstrators' symbolic speech).
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there are occasional situations in which free speech interests should
trump copyright.
B.

When Copyright Rights Are Used Illegitimately to Suppress Speech

In one sense, all of copyright law is censorial. Copyright creates
property rights in expression and punishes those who use the expression
without permission.73 But the restraints copyright places on speech are in
most instances a necessary price for encouraging authors to create
speech. By giving authors property rights in their expression, copyright
law makes the marketplace of ideas richer, not poorer.74
Copyright law also protects free speech by withholding protection
for facts and ideas.75 Thus, copyright ensures that the property rights it
creates do not unduly interfere with the free exchange of information
and ideas. The fair use defense provides further free speech protection
by allowing an author's expression to be used in instances in which there
is an overriding public interest.76
All of this suggests that copyright law ordinarily poses little danger
as a vehicle for censorship. Still, there remain instances in which
copyright owners use their property rights not to protect their economic
interests but to suppress speech they want kept out of the marketplace of
ideas.
One common scenario for this "censorship" occurs when a
copyright owner does not want the public to have access to what an
author has said.77 Typically, the owner is concerned that the author's
words will provide support for critics who claim that the author or the
copyright owner has said or done something wrongful or embarrassing.
A recent example is the effort by the Diebold Company to take
down copies of employee emails that two Swarthmore students posted
on the Internet.7 s To be sure, one could argue that these emails qualified

73.
74.

See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 501 (2000) (authorizing copyright infringement actions).
See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 83 (explaining that copyright protection

encourages authors and artists to engage in speech, and that absent such protection, "less speech
would occur").
75. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000) (providing that copyright protection does not extend to "any

idea" or "discovery").
76. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000) (codification of fair use doctrine).
77.

See HEINS & BECKLES, supra note 63, at 36 (noting that a percentage of DMCA take-

down letters in a survey were aimed at websites with criticism or commentary, suggesting "that they
may have been targeted at least in part because the IP owner did not like the message that they were
expressing").
78. Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1197 (N.D. Cal. 2004). Other
recent examples include NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471, 475 (2d Cir. 2004) (producers
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as copyrightable literary works and that Diebold, as the employer of the
authors, was the copyright owner under the work-for-hire doctrine.7 9 But
the case had nothing to do with Diebold's rights to economically exploit
these copyrightable works. Indeed, as the district judge pointed out,
"Diebold clearly ... indicated that it never intended to publish the
emails." 80 To the contrary, Diebold wanted the emails taken off the Net
because they were embarrassing. The emails openly acknowledged
problems with Diebold's voting machines and the potential risk that the
machines might incorrectly tabulate the results of an election.8 1
What should a court do when a party uses copyright law for such a
censorial purpose? Just as courts are unwilling to tolerate government
regulations that illegitimately censor speech, so should courts readily
strike down this illegitimate use of copyright rights by private parties.
Of course, one might argue that censorship of speech by private
parties should not raise any First Amendment concerns. But, as argued
in Part I, it is highly questionable whether the government should be
able to delegate the right to illegitimately censor speech to private
parties. This is not the intended purpose of copyright law, regardless of
whether the speech itself might technically be copyrightable.
Copyright owners could rightfully claim that the Supreme Court
has also recognized a copyright owner's right not to speak-particularly
when the work at issue is unpublished.8 2 But this kind of "autonomy"
interest rings hollow in a case like Diebold's. To begin with, this is not a
classic example of the government forcing a person to say something he
or she does not believe (children being forced to recite the Pledge of
Allegiance or Jehovah's Witnesses being forced to use a license plate
with an offensive slogan).8 3 To the contrary, the words at issue are the
voluntary expression of Diebold employees. Nor is this a case, like
Harper & Row, where an author intends to eventually publish his work
but thinks his words are not yet ready for distribution. 84 Diebold was not
of business training seminars trying to stop a "cult de-programmer" from posting on the Intemet
reports criticizing the plaintiff's programs and quoting from the plaintiff's course manual); Ty, Inc.
v. Publ'n Int'l Ltd., 292 F.3d 512, 515, 520 (7th Cir. 2002) (the maker of "beanie babies" trying to
suppress criticism of its products in the defendant's collectors' guides).
79. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2000).
80. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d at 1203 n.13.
81. Id. at 1203.
82. See supra notes 46, 59 and accompanying text.
83. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 707, 717 (1977) (requiring Jehovah's Witnesses to
display state license plate with motto "Live Free or Die" violated their right not to speak); W. Va.
State Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (compelling public school student to recite
Pledge of Allegiance violated student's right not to speak).
84. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 557, 564 (1985).
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concerned that the emails were not ready for publication. It simply found
them embarrassing and did not want them disclosed.
Finally, it is doubtful that a company like Diebold could claim that
copyright law is supporting any legitimate privacy claim. While an
individual like J. D. Salinger might have a legitimate privacy interest in
keeping his unpublished letters from being disclosed, business entities
do not have a comparable personal privacy interest. 85 Indeed, comments
in the Restatement of Torts specifically note that a "corporation,
partnership or unincorporated association has no personal right of
privacy." 86 Even if Diebold claims, as it did, that the emails contain trade
secrets, courts are unlikely to sustain its claim because wrongful or
embarrassing
information is not a trade secret "used in the operation of a
87
business.,

Even when an individual wants to use copyright rights to prevent
disclosure of his embarrassing expression, it is doubtful that the privacy
interest should trump free speech interests in those instances in which
there is an overriding public interest in the speech. A candidate for
public office, for instance, should not be able to stop publication of
unpublished letters that contain information reflecting upon his or her
qualifications for office. Likewise, one could argue that a public figure
like L. Ron Hubbard should not be able to stop critics from publishing

85.

Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 99 (2d Cir. 1987).

86.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 6521 cmt. c. (1977); see also Med. Lab. Mgmt.

Consultants v. Am. Broad. Cos., 931 F. Supp. 1487, 1493 (D. Ariz. 1996) (concluding that a
corporation has no privacy rights).
87. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (1995) (defining a trade secret
as "any information that can be used in the operation of a business" and that affords to its owner "an
actual or potential economic advantage over others"). The Supreme Court captured this notion in
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.:
We emphasize that the value of a trade secret lies in the competitive advantage it
gives its owner over competitors ....

If... a public disclosure of data reveals, for

example, the harmful side effects of the submitter's product and causes the submitter to
suffer a decline in the potential profits from sales of the product, that decline in profits
stems from a decrease in the value of the pesticide to consumers, rather than from the
destruction of an edge the submitter had over its competitors, and cannot constitute the
taking of a trade secret.
467 U.S. 986, 1011 n.15 (1984).
By contrast, a copyright owner has a legitimate reason for keeping a work from being
disclosed when the value of the work is dependent upon the public being denied general access.
This is the case, for example, with a standardized test that is administered from year to year. See,
e.g., Chicago Bd. of Educ. v. Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624, 631-32 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding that the
defendant's publication of six of the plaintiffs standardized tests was not a fair use). Even here, the
court acknowledged that the defendant, in order to be able to effectively criticize the plaintiffs tests,
might be permitted to disclose some of the test questions. Id. at 629. But the defendant failed to
justify his wholesale publication of six entire tests. Id. at 629-3 1.
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writings to demonstrate the
passages of Hubbard's unpublished
88
hypocrisy of his public statements.
There are a couple of important qualifications to these observations.
First, if critics can adequately substantiate their arguments by simply
using "facts" or "ideas" from a copyrighted work, then there is a good
argument for denying them the right to reproduce the copyrighted
expression. Professor Nimmer, for instance, argued that the Second
Circuit incorrectly decided the Rosemont Enterprisesv. Random House
case when it held that the unauthorized biographer of Howard Hughes
had a fair use privilege to use copyrighted articles about Hughes.89
Nimmer claimed that the biographer was fully capable of writing his
biography by using the unprotected facts from the articles, and that there
was no need to use the exact expression from the underlying articles. 90
Still, it is equally clear that in some instances a critic's complaints
will only have credibility if the critic can impeach the target with his
own words. In such instances-and the Diebold and L. Ron Hubbard
cases are good examples-only using the target's expression will suffice
to make the indictment stick. Indeed, the Supreme Court has long
recognized that sometimes specific expression is necessary to capture an
idea. As the Court explained in Cohen v. California,"we cannot indulge
the facile assumption that one can forbid particular words without also
running a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process." 91
None of this means that the First Amendment creates an open
hunting season on the expression of public figures. The Supreme Court
was absolutely right in Harper & Row to say that public figures will
have little incentive to write memoirs if the First Amendment permits

88. Hubbard's Church of Scientology has frequently tried to use copyright law to stop
dissenters from reproducing Scientology works, but has usually not met with success. See, e.g., New
Era Publ'ns Int'l v. Carol Publ'g Group, 904 F.2d 152, 157 (2d Cir. 2000) (discussing the
applicability of the fair use doctrine to a biography of L. Ron Hubbard); New Era Publ'ns Int'l v.
Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576, 577 (2d Cir. 1989) (upholding denial to issue an injunction against
the publication of a biography of L. Ron Hubbard); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line
Commc'n Servs., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1231, 1246 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (discussing the classification of
various works by Hubbard for determination of fair use); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. F.A.C.T.NET, Inc.,
901 F. Supp. 1519, 1521, 1527 (D. Colo. 1995) (denying request for a preliminary injunction
against F.A.C.T.NET for displaying works associated with Scientology on an Internet bulletin board
service); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma, 908 F. Supp. 1362, 1364 (E.D. Va. 1995) (granting
summary judgment to a former scientologist who published a court document containing
"Advanced Technology" works on the Internet).
89. Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 311 (2d Cir. 1966).
90. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 57, at § 1.10[D] (concluding that the "copying of the
expression in Rosemont was merely labor saving, and not essential, to the expression of the idea").
91. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971).
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the widespread pillaging of their expression.92 But those are instances in
which authors want the public to have access to their works. It is simply
a question of who does the publishing.93 The First Amendment concerns
are much more salient when copyright owners are trying to deny
the
94
public access to expression as a way of keeping people in the dark.
The other common scenario of copyright owners using their rights
to censor speech is when they fear that their expression will be used to
ridicule their own work. This is the case when third parties want to use
an author's expression to parody the author's work or to criticize it.
There are many examples of this: the owners of Pretty Woman trying to
stop the 2 Live Crew parody; the Gone with the Wind owners trying to
stop the publication of The Wind Done Gone; Disney trying to stop the
publication of the Air Pirates parody; and Mattel trying to stop the
distribution of photographs skewering (or more accurately blending)
Barbie. 95
Once again, the common theme in these cases is that the copyright
owners are not concerned that the users are exploiting a market the
owners desire to exploit-copyright owners do not usually exploit the
market for ridiculing their works. Rather, the owners want to prevent
users from criticizing their works. To be sure, harsh criticism of the
copyright owners' works might make the works less valuable, but the
copyright owners have no right to maintain the value of their works by
denying the public access to criticism. 96 If Jerry Falwell cannot use tort

92. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 557-59 (1985).
93. Id. at 564.
94. Even if the copyright owner is trying to keep the public in the dark, that does not mean
that other parties should have a wholesale right to reproduce as much of the copyright owner's work
as they would wish. While limited excerpts might be necessary to substantiate a party's criticism,
wholesale reproduction of a copyright owner's work could not only damage a copyright work's
economic value, but also, if the work is a type that loses its value if made public (for example, a
standardized test), the publication of the entire document could destroy its value. In Chicago Bd. of
Educ., 354 F.3d 624, 631 (7th Cir. 2003), for instance, the court held the defendant's publication of
six entire standardized tests actionable even though the defendant alleged that publication was
necessary to demonstrate the illegitimacy of the tests. As the court noted, he had a right "to quote
some of the test questions in order to substantiate his criticisms ...[b]ut he does not have the right,
as he believes he does ...to destroy the tests by publishing them indiscriminately"). Id. at 629-30.
95. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 572-74 (1994) (Pretty Woman case);
Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1259 (11 th Cir. 2001) ("Wind Done Gone"
case); Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 753 (9th Cir. 1978) ("Air Pirates" case);
Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 796 (9th Cir. 2003) ("Barbie" case).
96. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592 (noting that "'parody may quite legitimately aim at garroting
the original, destroying it commercially as well as artistically,"' and that "the role of courts is to
distinguish between '[b]iting criticism [that merely] suppresses demand [and] copyright
infringement[, which] usurps it."'); see also Mattel, 353 F.3d at 801 (noting that "because parody is
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law to stop the media from viciously mocking his reputation, then surely
Disney has no greater right to use copyright law to stop the parodying of
Mickey Mouse.97 Subjection to criticism is "the price that, under the
First Amendment, must be paid in the open marketplace of ideas. 98
Regardless of whether copyright owners are trying to prevent the
public from accessing an author's expression, or are trying to prevent
others from using the expression to ridicule it, there are common
characteristics in both instances. First, in neither instance are copyright
owners asserting their rights to protect their economic interests. In the
first instance, the owners have no intention of ever exploiting the work
because it is a source of embarrassment. In the second instance, the
owners have no intention of exploiting the market for criticism and
parody of their works. 99 Second, the intent of the copyright owners in
asserting their rights is to deny the public access to information that the
owners find offensive or embarrassing. Private parties should no more
be able to use copyright law for this purpose than private parties can use
defamation law, privacy law, or the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress to deny the public access to truthful information on a
matter of public concern.
Of course, in virtually all of these instances, courts could properly
resolve these disputes without resorting to the First Amendment. The
'a form of social and literary criticism,' it has 'socially significant value as free speech under the
First Amendment"').
97. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 486 U.S. 46, 50 (1988); accord L.L. Bean, Inc. v.
Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 31 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding a pornographic magazine's parody
of an L.L. Bean catalog was not actionable under trademark law because "[n]either the strictures of
the First Amendment nor the history and theory of anti-dilution law permit a finding of tarnishment
based solely on the presence of an unwholesome or negative context in which a trademark is used
without authorization").
98. NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471, 482 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that quoting a
plaintiff's course manual for purposes of criticizing the plaintiff's services was likely to be a fair
use); see also Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm't, Inc., 342 F.3d 191, 205-06 (3d Cir.
2003) (stating that "[a] copyright holder's attempt to restrict expression that is critical of it (or of its
copyrighted good, or the industry in which it operates, etc.) may, in context, subvert... copyright's
policy goal to encourage the creation and dissemination to the public of creative activity").
99. Of course, the right to criticize or parody does not include a right to usurp copyright
owners' legitimate market for their works. Their works should only be used in ways that will not
supersede the demand for the original or for derivative works based on the original. Ty, Inc. v.
Publ'ns Int'l Ltd., 292 F.3d 512, 517 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting that if a book reviewer were "to quote
the entire book in his review, or so much of the book as to make the review a substitute for the book
itself, he would be cutting into the publisher's market, and the defense of fair use would fail"). The
market for derivative criticism or parody of a work, however, is not a market that copyright owners
would ordinarily be expected to exploit. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592 (noting that "the unlikelihood
that creators of imaginative works will license critical reviews or lampoons of their own productions
removes such uses from the very notion of a potential licensing market").
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fair use doctrine, an elastic "rule of reason," can easily serve as the
rationale for allowing the use of a copyright owner's expression. 10 0
Indeed, most of the cases mentioned above were properly resolved using
the fair use doctrine.'10
Using fair use to resolve copyright/free speech conflicts is not only
acceptable but desirable. To the extent that courts can incorporate free
speech interests into their fair use analysis, they can avoid invoking the
Constitution and adding another layer to their legal analysis. But the
First Amendment must continue to loom in the background of these
02
cases to ensure that free speech interests are adequately protected.
Congress cannot legislatively eliminate these First Amendment
protections if it amends or even eliminates the statutory fair use defense.
And if fair use jurisprudence evolves in a manner that is inadequately
sensitive to free speech interests, then10 3defendants should always be able
to assert a First Amendment defense.
Finally, it is important to consider issues relating to procedure and
remedies. After all, even if parties have a strong claim that the First
Amendment protects their use of a copyrighted work, the prospect of
having to litigate even a successful First Amendment defense might
cause them to shy away from the use. This may be an unavoidable
chilling effect of an overly expensive and cumbersome litigation system.
But there are ways in which courts could help reduce the chilling effect
of frivolous, albeit expensive, copyright claims.
First, lower courts should be encouraged to grant summary
judgment in cases in which a copyright owner's assertion of rights seems

100. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448 (1984).
101. Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 812 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that
parody photographs of Barbie Doll were a fair use); Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268
F.3d 1257, 1276-77 (11th Cir. 2001) (concluding that the defendant's fair use defense is likely to
prevail at trial).
102. See Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1265 (stating that "courts often need not entertain related
First Amendment arguments in a copyright case," but "must remain cognizant of the First
Amendment protections interwoven into copyright law"); Nat'l Rifle Ass'n of Am. v. Handgun
Control Fed'n of Ohio, 15 F.3d 559, 562 (6th Cir. 1994) (noting that "[t]he scope of the fair use
doctrine is wider when the use relates to issues of public concern").
103. See generally Rubenfeld, supra note 2, at 20 (stating that the "economically oriented fair
use doctrine cannot remotely be viewed as 'coextensive' with First Amendment analysis");
Garfield, supra note 2, at 604 (stating that "[c]ourts performing a fair use analysis... may focus so
intently on the property implications of a defendant's actions that they may fail to appreciate the
speech implications"); Robert C. Denicola, Freedom to Copy, 108 YALE L.J. 1661, 1678 (1999)
(noting that the fair use doctrine is "constrained by economic considerations foreign to the First
Amendment").
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to be clearly illegitimate.10 4 The hallmarks of such a claim-that they are
based not on economic interests but on an interest in suppressing
speech-have already been discussed above. Second, courts should
strongly favor the award of attorney fees to successful defendants in
cases in which plaintiff copyright owners are wrongfully using copyright
to suppress speech. The Copyright Act already permits courts in their
discretion to award attorney fees to a prevailing party and the Supreme
Court has made it clear that courts should consider whether an action
was frivolous or objectively unreasonable. 10 5 Cases in which copyright is
used for the illegitimate purpose of censoring speech should be
considered per se objectively unreasonable.
C. When CopyrightRights Are Usedfor a Legitimate PurposeBut the
Impact on Speech is Intolerable
Even when copyright owners have a legitimate reason for asserting
their rights, there may still be instances in which the impact of these
rights on speech interests is more than the First Amendment can tolerate.
This is comparable to the decisions courts make when they find a
legitimately enacted content-neutral time, place, and manner regulation
106
unconstitutional because of its impact on freedom of expression.
Judges are understandably reluctant to invalidate laws in this
context. They cannot boldly pronounce actions unconstitutional as they
can with wholly illegitimate regulations of speech. Instead, they must
wade into the murky waters of balancing society's legitimate interest in
regulating speech against society's competing interest in a robust
marketplace of ideas. 10 7
Making matters worse, this balancing process is highly subjective.
Parties may trot out empirical evidence but the evidence is likely to be
biased, ambiguous, or inconclusive. Nor do judges have any special
training in evaluating social science data (as Justice Powell once
104. This would be the judicial equivalent of what some states have done with "SLAPP"
statutes, statutes intended to curb "Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation." These statutes
allows defendants to bring a special motion to strike a complaint unless a plaintiff can establish by
pleading and affidavit a probability that he or she will prevail on the merits. See, e.g., Gilbert v.
Sykes, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 752, 770 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (striking plaintiff's defamation
complaint using the California anti-SLAPP legislation).
105. Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 n.19 (1994) (stating that judges, in deciding
whether to award attorney's fees, can consider factors such as whether an action was frivolous,
brought in bad faith, or objectively unreasonable); see also 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2000) (providing that a
court may award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing party).
106. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
107. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
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confessed, "[m]y 10 8understanding of statistical analysis ... ranges from
limited to zero").

Perhaps because of the difficulty of this endeavor, judges often
create artificial excuses for avoiding this balancing process. They might,
for instance, declare a law to be a "neutral law of general applicability"
and therefore, for some inexplicable reason, immune from First
Amendment scrutiny. 0 9 That is in effect what the Supreme Court did
with contractual suppression of speech in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co." 0
Judges have often done the same with copyright law by saying that it
incorporates free speech interests so that any First Amendment analysis
is superfluous.'
But judges are shirking their responsibilities under the First
Amendment when they use these artificial means to avoid serious review
of legitimate but speech-impacting regulations. To fulfill their
responsibility, they must wrestle with the difficult task of balancing the
interest in favor of regulating speech against the impact of the regulation
on speech.
Fortunately, judges needing to assess the speech impact of
legitimate assertions of copyright rights are not without guidance. To the
contrary, one can extrapolate from First Amendment jurisprudence a
number of key factors for determining when legitimate regulations of
speech have an intolerable impact. It is helpful to consider these factors
in the contexts in which copyright laws are most likely to negatively
impact on speech.
1. When Congressional Acts Have an Intolerable Impact on
Speech
There is little reason to suspect that Congress uses its power to
enact copyright laws to censor unpopular ideas. Thus, copyright laws are
not an illegitimate form of censorship that can be summarily found
unconstitutional. Instead, copyright laws are legitimate regulations
enacted for the desirable and constitutional goal of promoting the
creation and distribution of works of authorship.

108. JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. (1994), reprinted in JOHN
MONAHAN & LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW 315 (5th ed. 2002).
109. See Alan E. Garfield, The Mischief of Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 35 GA. L. REV. 1087,

1092-1104 (2001) (discussing how the Supreme Court uses the fact that a law is a "neutral law of
general applicability" as a reason for not giving the law serious judicial scrutiny).
110.

See id. (discussing how the Supreme Court used the doctrine of neutral law of general

applicability to avoid giving serious scrutiny to the promissory estoppel claim at issue in Cohen).
111.

See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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Yet even legitimate content-neutral laws can have an intolerable
impact on speech. The Supreme Court, for instance, has invalidated a
ban on leafleting even though it acknowledged that the government has a
legitimate interest in preventing littering.' 1 2 Likewise, the Court has
recognized that the government has legitimate interests in promoting13
privacy and safety, but still cannot ban all door-to-door solicitations.
promoting aesthetics could not
And a legitimate government interest in
14
signs.'
lawn
justify a ban on residential
The point in each of these cases is not that the government's
can
interest was illegitimate. Instead, the point is that a speech regulation
15
purpose.'
legitimate
a
for
enacted
when
even
be unconstitutional
Copyright laws, like other laws, can sometimes impose too high a
price on speech interests. Indeed, there is good reason for fearing that the
political process in Washington will produce copyright laws that are
inadequately sensitive to speech interests. After all, and as commentators
have noted, the political process is heavily slanted in favor of the
copyright industries whose lobbying power and financial resources
easily overwhelm the diffuse public interest in access to copyrighted
materials." 16 If judicial review is particularly appropriate when the
political process is unlikely to protect civil liberties, then copyright laws
117
are a prime candidate for judicial monitoring.
But how will courts know whether any given copyright provision
violates the First Amendment? Who, after all, can say whether any given
duration for copyrightable works is "too much" or whether efforts to
stop piracy fail to strike the "right" balance between the interests of
copyright owners and the interests of the public?
Whether they like it or not, judges must make these calls. For as
Justice Marshall said, it is the judiciary that has the power "to say what

112. See Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 160-62 (1939).
113. See Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143, 149 (1943).
114. See City ofLadue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 48-49, 58-59 (1994).
115. This seems to be particularly true when laws negatively impact on traditionally cheap and
easy methods of grassroots communication. See, e.g., City of Ladue, 512 U.S. at 57 (stating that

"[riesidential signs are an unusually cheap and convenient form of communication" and that
"persons of modest means ...may have no practical substitute"); cf Members of the City Council
of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 819 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (in arguing
that a complete ban on signs on public property should be unconstitutional, Brennan urged the
majority not to discount the fact that this "medium of communication is particularly valuable

because it entails a relatively small expense in reaching a wide audience").
116.

See Pamela Samuelson, Copyright and Freedom of Expression in Historical Perspective,

10 J.INTELL. PROP. L. 319, 326 (2003) (noting that the "success of U.S. copyright industries has
made Congress quite receptive to arguments for stronger and longer legal protection").
117.

United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
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the law is.""18 Fortunately, First Amendment jurisprudence is rich with

instances in which judges have carefully balanced the government's
interest in regulation against free speech interests. 119 Courts can extract
from this jurisprudence lessons as to when Congressionally-enacted
copyright laws have gone too far.
One of the primary factors courts consider when evaluating a
content-neutral regulation of speech is whether the regulation leaves
open "ample alternative channels for communication."' 120 In other words,
will messages still make it to the marketplace of ideas even if a court
upholds the regulation?
Copyright law does not ordinarily create the risk that ideas will be
kept from the marketplace of ideas because copyright rights do not
protect either ideas or facts. This "definitional balance" helps ensure that
copyright does not unduly trench upon speech interests. 21 Yet this also
implies that courts monitoring copyright legislation should be on the
alert for any legislation that threatens to alter this balance. 22 Laws that
raise the prospect of protecting facts or ideas (as some commentators
have suggested about proposed database bills) threaten to cut off all
channels of communication for certain facts and ideas and therefore
23
must be carefully scrutinized.
Similarly, laws that prevent the public from accessing works to
extract unprotected facts and ideas are also problematic. This is the
concern that scholars have raised with the Digital Millennium Copyright

118. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). In his dissent in Eldred v. Ashcroft, the
Supreme Court decision upholding the Copyright Term Extension Act, Justice Stevens chided the
majority for "quitclaim[ing] to Congress its principal responsibility in this area of the law." Eldred
v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 242 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting). He recalled Chief Justice John
Marshall's "trenchant words" from Marbury v. Madison that "'[i]t is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is' and urged the court to discharge that
responsibility. Id. (citation omitted).
119. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
120. Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (stating that time,
place, and manner restrictions in a public forum will be upheld only if they are "justified without
reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant
governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of
the information").
121. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985).
122. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221 (suggesting that First Amendment scrutiny ofcopyright law is
unnecessary as long as "Congress has not altered the traditional contours of copyright protection").
123. See, e.g., J.H. Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, Database Protectionat the Crossroads:Recent
Developments and Their Impact on Science and Technology, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 793, 833-36
(1999) (discussing, inter alia, First Amendment concerns raised by Congressional efforts to protect
factual databases).
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Courts might reasonably conclude that these

access protections are a necessary evil to ensure that piracy does not
altogether eliminate the incentives for creating and distributing works,
but it is the responsibility of courts to at least consider whether there are
works that will take less of a toll on
alternative methods for protecting
25

the marketplace of ideas.
Even when copyright law leaves the idea/expression dichotomy
intact, there can still be instances in which the government's interest in
regulating does not justify the cost to speech interests. Copyright

duration that lasts for nearly a century, for instance, delays the ability of
other authors who cannot afford a license or are denied one from making
adaptations of a work. The public at large is then denied access to these
126
the original work.
derivative works, not to mention cheaper access to
Is this cost to speech interests justified by the remote benefits to authors
and their families from a longer duration or by the trade benefits of
coordinating our term limits with those of Europe? Maybe, but courts
because it only
should not breezily dismiss a First Amendment challenge
2 7
expression.1
another's
use
to
right
affects someone's

124. See Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Propery Law, 19002000, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2187, 2237-38 (2000); David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 673, 702-34 (2000); Benkler, Free as the Air, supra
note 2, at 419. Scholars have also expressed concerns that technological controls on access could
prevent the public from accessing a work for purposes of using it for a fair use and could even
prevent the public from accessing works that are in the public domain. See Samuelson, supra note
116, at 330 (noting that "[tiechnical measures will not cease limiting access and use when the
copyright expires").
125. See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 453-58 (2d Cir. 2001)
(upholding against First Amendment challenge an injunction issued pursuant to the DMCA). Alfred
Yen has argued that the DMCA safe harbor provisions are also inadequately sensitive to First
Amendment interests because they create an incentive for ISPs to be overly aggressive in removing
material from the Internet, even when it is unclear whether the material is infringing. See Yen, supra
note 2, at 1888.
126. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 249 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that the "extra royalty
payments" owed because of the increased duration of works "will not come from thin air" but
"ultimately come from those who wish to read or see or hear those classic books or films or
recordings that have survived").
127. In Eldred v. Aschroft, the Supreme Court decision upholding the Copyright Term
Extension Act, Justice Breyer explained in his dissent why he "would look harder than does the
majority at the statute's rationality":
is necessary only to recognize that this statute involves not pure economic regulation,
[I]t
but regulation of expression, and what may count as rational where economic regulation
is at issue is not necessarily rational where we focus on expression-in a Nation
constitutionally dedicated to the free dissemination of speech, information, learning, and
culture.
Eldred, 537 U.S. at 244-45 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Samuelson, supra note 116, at 328
(stating that "the utilitarian rationale for granting authors limited rights in their works has given way
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2.

When a Private Party's Assertion of Copyright Rights Has an
Intolerable Impact on Speech
Copyright owners do not typically use their rights to wrongfully
censor speech. To the contrary, the owners usually want their works to
be publicly distributed and performed, and merely want to be
compensated for these uses. This is a perfectly legitimate use of
copyright rights. Indeed, the raison d'etre of copyright is to create this
right of compensation so that authors and distributors will have an
128
incentive to create and publish works.
Yet there can still be rare instances in which even a copyright
owner's demand for compensation might exact too high a toll on speech
interests. This is likely to occur only when the public's interest in
accessing speech is particularly strong, and the copyright owner is
seeking to exact too high a price for this access.
Imagine, for instance, that a law professor writes a letter with a
detailed legal argument justifying government torture of terrorist
suspects. The professor then, unsolicited, sends the letter to the Attorney
General's office. As things turn out, the Attorney General is favorably
impressed by the professor's argument and the letter ends up providing
the legal foundation for the administration's policy favoring the use of
torture.
A major policy debate erupts over the legality of torturing terrorist
suspects, and it comes to light that the professor's letter laid the
foundation for the administration's hard-line position. The nation's
leading newspaper then obtains a copy of the letter from people in the
administration and wants to publish it in its entirety. The paper contacts
the professor, who is happy to oblige, but only for $150,000.
If the editors find the license fee prohibitively expensive, they
might nevertheless publish the letter without permission. Of course, a
court might find the publication a fair use since it was done for news
reporting. On the other hand, the fact that the paper reproduced the entire
work, and thereby may have destroyed the author's ability to sell copies
of the work, might argue against fair use. If a court finds that the use was
not fair, it could award statutory damages at the professor's option. If the
to pure rent-seeking behavior by dominant industry players" which is "plainly illustrated by the
Congressional decision in 1998 to extend the copyright term of existing works for another twenty

years").
128. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) ("The economic philosophy behind the
clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement
of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of

authors and inventors in 'Science and useful Arts.' Sacrificial days devoted to such creative
activities deserve rewards commensurate with the services rendered.").
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use is found to be "willful," the paper could potentially be liable for up
to $150,000.129
This hypothetical raises a dilemma. On the one hand, it could be
argued that an important public interest would be served by giving the
public access to the professor's work. While the paper would be free to
reproduce facts and ideas in the letter, and short excerpts would
undoubtedly be a fair use, it may be that the only effective way for the
public to fully understand and critique the administration's argument is
to read the letter in its entirety.
On the other hand, even if the professor did not initially write the
letter with any expectation of compensation (and, indeed, he has never
done his scholarly writings for direct compensation), he is still the
author of the work and is arguably entitled to compensation if the work
is going to be publicly distributed. He does not desire to suppress the
speech-he is willing to license its publication-he just insists on an
exorbitant fee. Copyright licensing fees are ordinarily left to freedom of
contract, so if the owner wants to be hardnosed about the fee, it is his
prerogative.
What might the First Amendment say about this? The professor's
desire to receive some compensation for the use of his work is perfectly
legitimate, but there is also a powerful speech interest in having this
work available for the public to read. The fee the professor seeks,
however, might preclude the work from being published. Of course, in
most instances, reasonable parties would negotiate until they found a
price they could agree upon. But this professor refuses to negotiate.
While not exactly comparable, this situation resembles in some
respects one in which a city charges a flat fee for anyone wanting to use
a public park for a rally. The fee is intended to cover the costs of
cleaning up the park and possible police protection. The Supreme Court
has held that such fees are unconstitutional if the amount of the fee is left
to the unbridled discretion of a government official or if it varies upward
based upon the likelihood of a hostile public reaction (thus, in effect,
not, however,
giving the public a heckler's veto). 130 The Court 13has
1
impermissible.
necessarily
are
fees
flat
that
indicated

129. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2000).
130. See, e.g., Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 293-95 (1951) (invalidating permit
requirement where public official had unbridled discretion in deciding whether to issue permit);
Forsyth County, Georgia v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 133-36 (1992) (invalidating
permit requirement where fee for permit varied based upon the likely expense of maintaining order).
131. See KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1230-31 n.1
(15th ed. 2004) (noting that the Supreme Court "has never invalidated a content-neutral user fee").
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But what if the city charges a flat fee of $50,000? While there is no
danger that Communists will have to pay a higher fee than the Daughters
of the American Revolution, and thus no danger that viewpoint
discrimination is at work, the high fee might prevent most groups from
being able to use the park for a rally. The fee may be administered in a
content-neutral fashion, but it still might be more than the First
Amendment could tolerate. Moreover, it is also more than the city
undoubtedly needs to adequately cover its expenses associated with most
rallies.
This might be a situation where a judge would uphold a flat fee but
not uphold this particularly exorbitant one. 132 The judge might permit a
fee more closely correlated to the city's actual expenses, while at the
same time considering whether any revised fee would have an
unacceptable impact on the ability of groups to hold rallies in the city's
parks.
Perhaps the First Amendment should require a judge to make the
same type of corrective calculation in the case of the professor's letter.
The professor should be awarded a fair compensation for his actual
damages (which might be substantial if there is truly a market for copies
of his work). At the same time, if there is evidence that the paper acted
in good faith, that there were strong arguments for giving the public
access to the letter, and that the likely damages from the newspaper's
publication are considerably less than the requested license fee, then
perhaps the First Amendment should limit any damages to a reasonable
licensing fee for the work.
Once again, there is no reason why a judge could not accomplish all
of the above through copyright law. Under copyright law, a judge could
potentially find that the paper's use was a fair use so that the paper bore
no liability. Or, in the alternative, the judge could find the use infringing,
132. In invalidating a license fee applied to public distribution of religious literature, the
Supreme Court has said that "[flreedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of religion are
available to all, not merely to those who can pay their own way." Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319
U.S. 105, 111 (1943). Professor Van Houweling has said that the reach of this language is unclear,
but notes that some lower courts have read the case as insisting that speech permit fees be no more
than nominal to preserve speech opportunities of poorly financed speakers. Molly Shaffer Van
Houweling, Distributive Values in Copyright, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1535, 1552-53 (2005); see also, e.g.,
Stonewall Union v. City of Columbus, 931 F.2d 1130, 1136-37 (6th Cir. 1991); Cent. Fla. Nuclear
Freeze Campaign v. Walsh, 774 F.2d 1515, 1522 (11 th Cir. 1985); see also Kevin Francis O'Neill,
Disentangling the Law of Public Protest, 45 LoY. L. REV. 411, 473 (1999) (stating that, "[t]aken
together, Cox, Schneider, Murdock and Follet stand for a basic principle: 'The state may recoup the
actual costs of governmental services that are generated by the use of public property for speech
activities, so long as the charge is not so great as to appear to the judiciary to be oppressive or
completely preclusive of speech.") (citation omitted).
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or her discretion to limit the statutory damages to a
but then use 1his
33
amount.
small
The importance of recognizing the First Amendment interests,
however, is not that a judge must resort to the First Amendment, but that
a judge must be attentive to First Amendment values however he or she
chooses to decide the case.
The First Amendment is perhaps most likely to be relevant in cases
in which there is an overriding interest in giving the public access to an
author's specific expression and not just facts or ideas derived from the
expression. Professor Nimmer's example of the My Lai Massacre
photograph is perhaps one such work, as might be the Zapruder
photographs or the video of the Rodney King beating.1 34 In each
instance, the copyright owner is entitled to compensation. We do not
want to eliminate the incentive to create these works. But at some point
the First Amendment may have to strike a balance between the copyright
need for access
owner's expectations of compensation and the public's
35
to a work of major historic or political significance.'
While First Amendment jurisprudence does not ordinarily focus on
limiting damages, there are some examples. Perhaps most noteworthy
are the Supreme Court's limitations on punitive and presumed damages
36
in the defamation context, unless the plaintiff can show actual malice.
The First Amendment might also be implicated by more garden
variety transaction costs that copyright creates for many small time
authors and artists. Documentary filmmakers, artists and other authors,
for instance, often find themselves barred from creating valuable
derivative works because of the difficulty and cost of identifying
copyright
owners and obtaining permission to use the underlying
37
works. 1

133.

This would be harder to do in a jury trial. See, e.g., Feltner v. Columbia Pictures

Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 342 (1998) (finding a constitutional right to a jury trial when a
copyright owner elects to recover statutory damages). In that instance, the First Amendment might
have to place limits on the amount of damages that a jury can award.
134. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 57, at § 1.10[C][2]. Compare L.A. News Serv. v.
Reuters Television Int'l, Ltd., 149 F.3d 987, 994-95 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that the broadcasting

without permission of copyrighted footage of the Rodney King beating was not a fair use), with
L.A. News Serv. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 305 F.3d 924, 942 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that the
broadcasting of the same work without permission was a fair use).
135. See Samuelson, supra note 116, at 329 (noting that "[o]ne way to respond to problems
posed by excessive pricing and other market failures is compulsory licensing").
136. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974).
137. See, e.g., HEINS & BECKLES, supra note 63, at 5; see also Center for Social Media, Stories
Untold, http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/videos/stories-untold/ (last visited July 4, 2007).
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Here, too, the toll exacted by copyright might be more than the
First Amendment should tolerate. The First Amendment might dictate,
for instance, that courts can award statutory damages in such instances
but must limit the award to a reasonable licensing fee, as long as the
author tried in good faith to obtain permission to use a work for 38a
reasonable fee or believed in good faith that his use was a fair use.'
And in some instances, where a derivative author uses small parts of
many works, so that it is impractical to obtain a license for each work,
courts should place the burden on copyright holders to sue and make it
clear that damages will be limited to reasonable licensing fees, thus
helping to prompt settlements. This is especially appropriate when the
users are non-profit groups pursuing educational, scholarship, teaching,
or reporting purposes.
An analogy can be made to damage limitations in the common law
of Contracts. Under contract law, damage awards do not ordinarily
punish breaching parties, but only seek to protect the expectations of the
non-breaching parties. 139 Thus, punitive damages are not generally
permitted and instead plaintiffs are typically limited to expectation
damages-damages intended to place them in140the position they would
have been in had the contract been performed.
A consequence of this rule is that contract law sometimes
encourages parties to breach.' 4 1 For instance, if Farmer A contracted to
deliver 1,000 bushels of corn to B at the end of the growing season, but
was subsequently offered $1 million by a movie producer to use the
Farmer's land for the summer (to put in a baseball field, perhaps), then
contract law would enable A to breach. A will not be subject to punitive
damages even though he knowingly and willingly breaches the contract.
At the same time, contract law will protect B by making A pay him
damages for any increase in the price of corn that B pays to obtain the
138. See Denicola, supra note 103, at 1678 (suggesting the propriety of issuing reasonable
license agreements); see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 n.10 (1994)
(suggesting that granting injunctive relief is not always appropriate when a party has created a new
transformative work and that a reasonable license fee might be appropriate); New York Times Co.,
v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 505 (2001) (implying that it may be appropriate in some instances for
courts to allow the use of a work for a reasonable fee); cf Orphan Works Act of 2006, H.R. 5439,
109th Cong. § 514(b)(l)(A) (2006) (limiting damages to "reasonable compensation for the use of
the infringed work"), reprinted in ROBERT A. GORMAN & JANE C. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT 498-500

(7th ed. 2006).
139. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 756 (3d ed. 1999) (noting that "[o]ur system of
contract remedies is not directed at compulsion ofpromisors to prevent breach; it is aimed, instead,
at relief to promises to redressbreach").
140. See id.
141. Id. at 763.
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corn elsewhere. Contract law enables A's "efficient breach" because it is
better for society if A uses his resources in the most efficient manner,
42
even if this means breaching a contract.
These contract rules are intended to help 'ensure the most efficient
use of resources in economic markets. 143 My argument here is that we
should have similar rules to protect the marketplace of ideas. If
copyright damages raise the specter of plaintiffs receiving punitive-like
damages-because of the risk of high statutory damages awards,
particularly if an infringement is found to be willful-then many parties
will avoid using copyrighted works even if they believe that their use is
a fair use or will only result in minimal harm to a copyright owner.
In these instances, the First Amendment should place limits on
statutory damages so that parties making limited use of copyrighted
works will not be deterred by the threat of these damages. Just as in
contract law, courts can still protect copyright plaintiffs by awarding
them "actual damages" for any infringement-perhaps, for instance, a
reasonable licensing fee for the use. But the threat of potentially
punitive-like statutory awards should be limited so that parties wanting
to make derivative works will not have their creative speech chilled.
3. When Contractual Suppression of Speech Has an Intolerable
Impact
What if copyright owners use contracts to complement or
supplement their copyright rights? Should the First Amendment place
limits on this suppression of speech or should it be irrelevant because the
suppression is "self-imposed?"
Of course, good arguments can be made for withholding First
Amendment scrutiny in this context. It is private parties, not the
government, who are deciding which speech to suppress. Withholding
judicial scrutiny also supports the individuals' autonomy rights to sell
their right to speak.
Yet the impact of these contracts on speech interests can be as great
or greater than copyright rights. Copyright law, after all, is the product
of a legislative process that at least in theory considers the public's best
interests. By contrast, there is no reason to expect that private parties,
given freedom of contract, will be equally solicitous of the public's
interest.
142.
143.

See id.
Id. (stating that to discourage efficient breaches "by compelling performance would result

in an undesirable wealth distribution, since the party in breach would lose more than the injured
party would gain").
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Contractual suppression of speech is also more threatening to
speech interests than other areas of law, like trespass, that do not trigger
heightened scrutiny. A landowner who refuses to tolerate certain speech
on his property, for instance, only succeeds in suppressing the speech in
a particular location. By contrast, if a copyright owner distributes his
work with a concomitant license that forbids the use of any facts144or
ideas, he can potentially block the free flow of ideas and information.
Any concern about the autonomy interests of private parties to buy
and sell their silence may also be overstated. To what extent, for
instance, are consumers truly exercising their right to sell their silence
when they agree to a standardized electronic contract? It is likely that
they never read the contract terms, so if they are bound, it is only
because the law imposes an obligation when parties appear-to a
reasonable person-to have assented. But once the law imposes
obligations without actual consent, the line between contract and tort
becomes considerably blurred. The logic of treating contract law
differently from defamation and privacy torts because of the
qualitatively different autonomy interests at stake seems highly dubious.
More importantly, any autonomy interest assumes that it is the right
of a private party to sell his silence. But what if the right is not his to
sell? Justice Souter made just such a suggestion in Cohen v. Cowles
Media Co. when he considered whether a source could buy a
newspaper's promise to keep quiet about his identity:
144. In explaining why the property law of trespass is less threatening to First Amendment
interests than the intellectual property rights created by copyright law, Jed Rubenfeld notes that
there is "an important inherent restriction" on the ability of a landowner to suppress speech: "It is
limited to speech that takes place on or with the use of the owner's property." Rubenfeld, supra note
2, at 28. By contrast, he notes that "[a] copyright owner's power over speech applies to the public at
large, anywhere and everywhere." Id. at 29. Contractual suppression of speech would fit somewhere
between these two models. On the one hand, it can only suppress the speech of parties who have
promised to suppress their speech. On the other hand, if copyrightable works are routinely sold with
standardized licenses that are held to be enforceable, then as a practical matter the copyright owner
can control the use of the speech "anywhere and everywhere." While it may be true, as Easterbrook
hypothesized in the ProCD case, that anyone who finds a copyrightable work lying on the street
would not be bound by the licensing agreement (even though their actions would still be regulated
by copyright law), ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1454 (7th Cir. 1996), technological
advances might for all practical purposes make it increasingly rare for people to access a work
without having to consent to a license. Moreover, even if a small percentage of people can access a
work without being subject to a license agreement, the impact of the contractual restrictions on all
the other licensees would still be significant. Why should the fact that there may be limited
exceptions immunize the contracts from First Amendment scrutiny? Indeed, even copyright law
does not create an absolute prohibition on the actions of third parties. Anyone who independently
creates a work that resembles a prior copyrighted work will not incur liability. MARSHALL A.
LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAw 59 (4th ed. 2005). But this exception does not
immunize copyright from First Amendment scrutiny.
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Nor can I accept the majority's position that we may dispense with
balancing because the burden on publication is in a sense "selfimposed" by the newspaper's voluntary promise of confidentiality.
This suggests both the possibility of waiver, the requirements for
which have not been met here, as well as a conception of First
Amendment rights as those of the speaker alone, with a value that may
be measured without reference to the importance of the information to
public discourse. But freedom of the press is ultimately founded on the
value of enhancing such discourse for the sake of a citizenry better
informed and thus more prudently self-governed. "[T]he First
Amendment goes beyond protection of the press and the selfexpression of individuals to prohibit government from limiting the
stock of information from which members of the public may draw." In
this context, "'fi]t is the right of the [public], not the right of the
[media], which is paramount. '
Of course, Congress is always free to statutorily preempt state
enforcement of contracts that interfere with free speech interests.
Congress could expressly provide in the Copyright Act that all contracts
which duplicate or interfere with the policies embodied in copyright law
are preempted. As things currently stand, courts interpreting the existing
preemption provision-section 301-generally do not find contracts
preempted by the Copyright Act. 146 A number of courts, however, have
held that the enforcement of contracts is preempted when the contracts
147
try to protect rights that are equivalent to those in the Copyright Act.
But even if Congress does not intervene, there are good reasons for
courts to consider whether the impact of a contract on speech interests is
more than the First Amendment should tolerate. Once again, this is not
likely to be the case in the garden variety use of contracts to protect
copyrightable works. But if parties use contracts to illegitimately keep
information from the public, to deny the public access to ideas and
information, or in ways that impose too high a price on speech interests,
then courts should be prepared to intervene.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Public discourse about copyright rights has become increasingly
strident in recent years. Jessica Litman has called this harsh exchange

145. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 677-78 (1991) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
146. See supra note 57.
147. See id.
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the "copyright war." 148 Those who object to the expansion of copyright
rights paint a picture of the copyright industries as faceless
conglomerates determined to "propertize" and "commoditize" all
sources of information. They tend to forget the fact that this "allpowerful" copyright industry is itself terrified that piracy facilitated by
new digital technologies is going to render its property rights
meaningless.
At the same time, representatives of the copyright industries tend to
describe their opponents as "anarchists" who encourage the rampant
theft of their intellectual property. They tend to ignore the fact that
copyright rights are not inherent natural rights, but are artificial rights
created by the government to benefit the public. They refuse to
proper scope of these rights is a legitimate subject
acknowledge that 1the
49
for public debate.
In an ideal world this battle would be fought out through the
political process with little need for judicial intervention. But when the
political process is incapable of adequately protecting constitutional
rights, including First Amendment rights, then courts must be prepared
to intervene. This is not inappropriate judicial intermeddling. It is judges
condition, of
ensuring that freedom of speech-"the indispensable
150
secured.
safely
freedom"-is
of
nearly every other form

148.
149.

Litman, supra note 13, at 1.
See id. at 3 (noting that the "enemies" in the copyright wars, depending upon one's

viewpoint, "are either apologists for piracy who insist that information and entertainment want to be
free or they're corrupt fat cats who are misusing copyright to shield their antiquated business
models from competition").
150. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937).
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